Abstract Arguments against essentialism in biology rely strongly on a claim that modern biology abandoned Aristotle's notion of a species as a class of necessary and sufficient properties. However, neither his theory of essentialism, nor his logical definition of species and genus (eidos and genos)
Introduction
What is a species? Few questions have received so much attention as that over the last century from biologists and philosophers of biology; perhaps only the meaning of the term gene has been so contentious. We hear variously that a species is this or that kind of entity, that they have this or that set of properties, that they are classes or individuals, and that they are one kind of thing, or many. Species are the ''units'' of classification, of evolution, levels of organization, mere conveniences of thought, of operation and of communication. However, through all this there is what biologists and philosophers of biology say, and what biologists do. No matter what theoretical considerations there may be that people offer to justify their views, biologists still name species, describe them, conserve them, and study them.
There is a widely held story that most people, if they have thought about the matter at all, usually hold, which has been repeated for 50 years, since the Centenary of the publication of the Origin. According to this view, sometimes called the ''essentialism story'' (Levit and Meister 2006) , and which many, like myself, reject as historically inaccurate (Charles 2002; McOuat 2001 McOuat , 2003 Winsor 2006a, b) , before Darwin species were held to be universals, classes or natural kinds, which had essential definitions. With Darwin comes recognition of the variation within species, that drives evolution by natural selection. From then on, biologists understood that species were polytypic, that they had no essential properties. Species come to be understood to be biological populations, protected against introgression by reproductive barriers, and philosophically as individuals. In researching for my book, Species: a history of the idea (Wilkins 2009 ), I came to realize that this was not accurate, and in fact, for some definitions of ''essentialism'' that there never has been any such essentialism in biology. Whether or not this is a reason for there not to be any now is a matter for further discussion (e.g., Devitt 2008) . Prior to the twentieth century, the very idea of essence in biology almost always applied to a functional essence rather than a taxonomic one 1 ; what we might now call the physiology of a plant or animal. Nehemiah Grew, for example, who introduced microscopy to botany, spoke of the essence of ''the plant'', meaning that which made the stem, the leaf, and the root and so forth, and not that which made a particular rose species (Grew 1682).
Discussion
The very word species has been a stumbling block in the essentialism story since its inception. We know it as a term of art in botany and zoology, and more recently across the entirety of biology, including viral species.
2 However, it originally had no real technical meaning in natural history, despite being a technical term in philosophy, theology, and psychology. It was, as John Locke noted, merely the vernacular Latin word for ''kind''. There was no implication that a species was a class, or that there was an essential set of properties; species were just things that naturalists began to pay attention to in the sixteenth century and thereafter.
The essentialism story developed gradually at first, in the comments about the role played by Aristotle and scholasticism in natural history, in particular in Dewey's essay on Darwin and philosophy (below). However, where we might expect essence of species to play a role in the criticism of prior thought, particularly among the early Darwinians in the period from 1860 to 1900, we do not. Instead, we find criticisms of the nature of investigation, or epistemological assumptions, such as in the History of Botany by enthusiastic Darwinian Sachs (1890), the first edition of which was published shortly into the Darwinian period in 1875. If we were to find this critique, we might expect it here of all places. Instead, we find criticism of the Aristotelian program of doing science by definition, and of teleology. The elimination of the latter was thought to be the major Darwinian innovation.
As is often noted, the Darwinian revolution was as much an epistemological or methodological shift as it was a theoretical one (Ghiselin 1974 (Ghiselin , 1997 Ruse 1989) . After the development of set theory, however, a distinction of the scholastics between intension, of sets that were circumscribed by definitions, and extension, by member inclusion, was revived, and the logical tradition of species was held to be a matter of intensional definition. In a seminal summary of the traditional pre-set theoretic logic of diairesis, or division, from the most general to the most specific, H. W. Joseph (1916) made a clear distinction, as Whately had 90 years earlier in 1826 (see below), between logical species and ''natural'' species, but the developers of the essentialism story failed to pick this up, and read him as saying that species of living things were the same as the logical species (as discussed in Chung 2003; Winsor 2001 Winsor , 2003 Winsor , 2006a .
Around the time of the Centenary of the publication of the Origin, in 1959, this story began to be developed, and it was elaborated over the subsequent period until it became the received view in the history and philosophy of biology. In part motivated by this story, and in part motivated by independent developments in philosophy, a young philosopher of biology, David Hull, published a paper which was titled ''The effects of essentialism on taxonomy: two thousand years of stasis'' (Hull 1965) , in which the claim was implicitly made that fixity of species was due to Aristotelian influences. Actually, though, fixism was motivated by piety and theology, not philosophy (as I document in my book), and essentialism in logic was, if anything, a post hoc justification of that claim; or it would be if there were strong historical evidence that essentialism in natural species was a widespread view. Moreover, typology, as Winsor has argued, was ubiquitous as a ''method of exemplars'' (Winsor 2003) , and it remains the standard approach even today, by Darwin and the evolutionists as much as by the idealists or fixists.
Dissent from the essentialism story began fairly early. Farber's work (1976) indicates that ''type'' had a more complex and nuanced role in taxonomy in the period immediately before Darwin than the essentialism story recounted. Moreover, there is no reason to think that any of these senses had any essentialist implications. Stung by criticisms of being ''typological'' by Mayr, some cladists began to investigate the historical material, and argued similarly (Nelson and Platnick 1981) , and several others (Atran 1985 (Atran , 1990 Stevens 1994) followed. The original source of the confusion of the essentialism story appears to arise with John Dewey's widely read 1909 article ''The influence of Darwin on philosophy'' (Dewey 1997) , which begins ''Few words in our language foreshorten intellectual history as much as does the word species.'' This is true, and Dewey himself does some of that critical foreshortening by not distinguishing the logical and philosophical sense of species from the use it had amongst naturalists and biologists, right from the beginning. He even writes
We dispose all too easily of the efforts of the schoolmen to interpret nature and mind in terms of real essences, hidden forms, and occult faculties, forgetful of the seriousness and dignity of the ideas that lay behind. We dispose of them by laughing at the famous gentleman who accounted for the fact that opium put people to sleep on the ground it had a dormitive faculty. But the doctrine, held in our own day, that knowledge of the plant that yields the poppy consists in referring the peculiarities of an individual to a type, to a universal form, a doctrine so firmly established that any other method of knowing was conceived to be unphilosophical and unscientific, is a survival of precisely the same logic. This identity of conception in the scholastic and anti-Darwinian theory may well suggest greater sympathy for what has become unfamiliar as well as greater humility regarding the further unfamiliarities that history has in store.
Therefore, Dewey misled generations of thinkers by identifying what the scholastic logicians, from whom we get the logical notions of genus and species, meant by these terms with what naturalists meant, despite his plea for sympathy with them. However, logicians knew this was a matter of mere homonymy. The only thing in common with logical and biological species was the word. Not even the logical scheme into which Aristotelian logic placed genera and species was copied in natural history 3 -unlike with logical kinds, there was only one level of genus and species in biological taxonomy, and many logic writers of the nineteenth century expressly stated that the meanings were different: One example in 1826, which is, note, when Darwin was still at university, is given by Archbishop Richard Whately, whose Elements of Logic (Whately 1875, original edition 1826 in the Encyclopedaedia Metropolitana) revitalized the study of logic by philosophers and mathematicians in the English speaking world:
… if anyone utters such a proposition as… ''Argus was a mastiff,'' to what head of Predicables would such a Predicate be referred? Surely our logical principles would lead us to answer, that it is the Species; since it could hardly be called an Accident, and is manifestly no other Predicable. And yet every Naturalist would at once pronounce that Mastiff, is no distinct Species, but is only a variety of the Species Dog…. … the solution of the difficulty is to be found in the peculiar technical sense… of the word ''Species'' when applied to organized Beings [a term that preceded the use of ''organism'']: in which case it is always applied (when we are speaking strictly, as naturalists) to individuals as are supposed to be descended from a common stock, or which might have so descended; viz. which resemble one another (to use M. Cuvier's expression) as much as those of the same stock do. [Elements of Logic (1826) Bk IV, ch. 5 §1 p. 183; 1875 fifth edition used]
On the older logic of division, the essence of a thing was known by dividing general classes (genera) into specific sub-classes (species, hence the names), and the division gave you the differentiating characters that made them what they were -the essences. However, Whately knew this was not the case in biology:
[The fact of two organisms being the same species] being one which can seldom be directly known, the consequence is, that the marks by which any Species of Animal or Plant is known, are not the very Differentia which constitutes that Species. [Op. cit.,
It's no accident that Whately quotes Cuvier; all educated readers of the day knew Cuvier's definition, which is itself a reworking of the definition given by John Ray in 1686, when the term species was given its first biological technical meaning. Ray wrote:
In order that an inventory of plants may be begun and a classification of them correctly established, we must try to discover criteria of some sort for distinguishing what are called ''species''. After long and considerable investigation, no surer criterion for determining species has occurred to me than the distinguishing features that perpetuate themselves in propagation from seed. Thus, no matter what variations occur in the individuals or the species, if they spring from the seed of one and the same plant, they are accidental variations and not such as to distinguish a species … Animals likewise that differ specifically preserve their distinct species permanently; one species never springs from the seed of another nor vice versa. Notice what Ray does here-although there is a mention of accidental variation, he does not appeal to the essence of a species, but to generation: the ''distinguishing features that perpetuate themselves in propagation from seed''. This is a causal definition of species; the features must make more of themselves. 4 It is not an arid Aristotelian definitional version, and nor is Cuvier's:
… the word species means the individuals who descend from one another or from common parents and those who resemble them as much as they resemble each other. Thus, we call varieties of a species only those races more or less different which can arise from it by reproduction. (Cuvier 1825 ; emphasis original Cuvier 1831)
There must be resemblance, but there has to be generation, and versions of this go as far back as the Epicureans, which I call the Generative Conception of Species. Therefore, logicians at one time knew this homonymy; by the time the essentialist story is in full flight, it has been forgotten. It is not coincidental that it was first forgotten at the time when genetics was being developed and elaborated.
Prior to around 1904, there was no such thing as the ''species problem''. Instead, there was a wholly different problem; the ''species question'', the ''mystery of mysteries'' that Darwin quoted from Herschel on the first page of the Origin of Species.
5 This was the question of the origin of species, which is why Darwin gave his book the name that he did. Darwin thought that he resolved that question, contrary to what textbook writers often say about him. That is discussed in my book, however; for now, note that the species problem arises at the time we think we have solved Grew's question of the functional essence of organismstheir genes. A number of geneticists, such as Thomas Hunt Morgan, had denied that species exist, and held that only genes do. The myth that Darwin also thought species were mere conveniences arose about then. Other geneticists, such as de Vries, proposed that an ''elementary'' species was properly to be thought of as a ''pure line'' of genes, and Lotsy defined a ''Jordanon'' as a group of genetically identical individuals, and a ''Linneon'' as the Ray-style definition of those who resemble each other more than any other group, but without the generative aspect. In 1908, a symposium published in American Naturalist (Arthur 1908; Bessey 1908; Boyd 1908; Britton 1908; Johnson 1908; Lewis 1908; Macdougal 1908) concluded that species were not real, and so the ''species question'' gave way to the ''species problem'', although the qualifier itself had been used by William Bateson before the Mendelian revolution began (Bateson 1894, p. 2) .
Essences according to the new geneticists were, in other words, genetic, and if no groups of organisms shared identical genetic constitutions, then there were no species. The new science was also concerned to establish itself against museum taxonomy, and so comments critical of ''morphological'' diagnosis of species began to appear in the literature. Dewey's identification of the concerns of the scholastics with those of pre-Mendelian biologists merely reinforced the growing tendency to deprecate those who had gone before.
However, biologists were not stupid or blind before Darwin, nor did they become clever and good observers simply by working after him and Mendel. They knew of species before they had a theory to go by that accounted for them, or a system of systematics to classify them with. They knew that species were variable, that they were usually but not always interfertile only with conspecifics, that they had typical forms and habitats, and generally that they were caused by a generative power or propensity, even if they had poorly formed notions of what caused that, or how it worked. This is even true of the pre-scientific herbalists who often reliably identified modern botanical species (Stannard 1979; Stannard et al. 1999 ).
This raises some interesting questions about the philosophical nature of species. Is it a question of theory whether species are real? Do we need to have a theory like genetics before we can ask what they are? Does the notion of species rely upon some more primitive concept, like population or gene pool? I believe the answer to all three questions is, No.
Species were not invented to be units of classification, 6 nor were they ever defined on a philosophical and logical basis. Such essences as they did have were always generative, rather than definitional, and the term most often used for the nature of species is ''type'', not ''essence'', which latter term is used almost exclusively to denote the key identifying traits to be used in the field, garden, or market place (the ''Essential Characters'' of the botanies of the post-Linnaean era). Essential characters are merely diagnostic aids, and no more are thought by pre-Darwinians or post-Darwinians to be the causes of particular species than a cross-vein on a wing used to identify a Tetriphid fruit fly is the cause of it being the sort of animal it is. 7 If species are indeed thought to have essences, they are of the developmental kind-a lifecycle that reliably generates the morphology, ecological niche occupancy and behavior that is typical. Since the species problem was posed in the context of genetics, and in particular in terms of shared genes, a promise that was quickly dashed by the discovery of polytypy and pleiotropy in natural populations of animals (Robson 1928) , at least, it became a kind of problem with essentialism, or rather it set up the conceptual preconditions for creating the essentialism story later, when the Modern Synthesis, so-called, had effectively won the day.
There is also a parallel series of stories also to do with essentialism in philosophy, via Karl Popper's attack on what he called methodological essentialism (Popper 1959) , which may or may not have actually existed amongst scientists and social scientists, and in metaphysics to do with nominalism and the nature of individuals (Strawson 1964) , at about the time the essentialism story was invented. Various authors have traced these diverse influences on the essentialism story, but the general message is clear: it is a back-rendering, what gamers and comics aficionados call ''ret-conning'' (making stories retroactively consistent), of the history to make the issues of the present time, around the 100th anniversary of Darwin's birth when it began, seem to be eternal ones in the history of biology, and indeed to show history to be progressive, something scientists more than most seem to need to believe of their own disciplines. While it is good rhetoric and understandable, it is bad history, and it even has a special name in historiography-the sin of Whiggism (Butterfield 1931) .
Still, if the essence of a species is not simple, and there are alleles, clines, inversions, and all the other variation in the constitution of members of species, then that is not the essence of a Popper or an Aristotle in any event. Therefore, does essentialism need to be harmful? The answer to that is, I think, to be found in a third parallel story, about the nature of natural kinds in philosophy. I will briefly rehearse it here. 8 At the turn of the nineteenth century, taxonomists knew very well that taxonomic classes were variable, but that they usually had a typical form. This was, you will recall, before the invention of statistics; today we might say that most taxa have a modal form. In a discussion of what counted as a kind in natural history, William Whewell in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840) gave a good account of natural kinds as being types from which there were deviations, although he treated species themselves as simple objects. John Stuart Mill disagreed and asserted that natural kinds were definable and had universal (causal) properties for all members (Mill 2006) . 9 For Whewell, the type of the taxonomist was a natural kind; for Mill, it was the element and the compound of chemistry and physics. Still, I believe the weight of venerable history is on Whewell's side, not Mill's, or to put it another way, that Mill's conception of natural kinds is not something that applies well to historical sciences that are restricted to specific domains, like natural history or taxonomy. And despite what we might think based on the discussion of logic from Frege onwards, as late as the early twentieth century, for instance with John Venn (1866) and others, a natural kind was indeed typically thought to be a kind of living beings, caused by generation (Hacking 1991) .
So much of the confusion about essences can be resolved if we do not adopt the view that Mill introduced, that a real Kind must have a set of necessary and sufficient properties. For Mill, a species would be a natural kind (a phrase introduced by Venn, although he did not adopt the Millian view regarding it; Mill just used the word Kind) if it had some set of universally shared properties that made each organism a member of it, rather like having a certain number of electrons, positrons, and neutrons makes each atom of an element that element. By contrast, for Whewell, and for those taxonomists who he was accurately describing in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, to be a member of some group, a species, a genus, and so on, is to be mostly like the typical form, and to be something that can be supposed to share a genealogy with that form. This sense of ''essence'' is something that, I believe, is quite consistent with our present understanding of genetics and populations; most members of most species share most genes, but there are multiple genetic controls over some typical traits, and some species have major genomic varieties. David Hull has said that there is nothing so unusual or absurd in biology that some species does not have it somewhere or somewhen; I call this Hull's Rule. To be an essentialist in the world of Hull's Rule means that you cannot insist that taxa are going to always have some set of genetic or other causes, but it does not mean that you cannot say that taxa mostly share causes. To be a taxon, I think, is to have some set of general properties, the bulk of which any member will share.
10 This is sometimes called in philosophy the ''family resemblance predicate'', after Ludwig Wittgenstein's example in the Philosophical Investigations (Pigliucci 2003; Wittgenstein 1968 ), but over a century before Wittgenstein, Whewell made just this case. Families resemble each other because they share generative histories and hence generative causes, but they share them typically.
The thesis known as the Individuality Thesis (Gayon 1996; Ghiselin 1997; Hull 1978) , in which species are considered to be not kinds, but named objects that have a 8 It is the topic of a forthcoming paper of mine on natural kinds in biology. 9 The difference between Mill and the Aristotelian project of science by definition is that Mill expected these properties to be causally active or constitutive. 10 And to not share them would mean that no taxon could be identified in any case. If there is a taxon, there must be some shared general properties.
Theory Biosci. (2010) 129:141-148 145 historical location, is a defense of biology, and especially genetics, against the encroachment of Mill's notion of a Natural Kind. Sure, say the individualists, species and other biological taxa are not Natural Kinds (as defined by Mill). The only other metaphysical notion open to philosophers of taxonomy is that of an Individual, a thing that exists in one time and one place or region, and has a start and an ending. Hence, species are Individuals. I cannot fault this logicspecies clearly are not the kinds of Kinds that Mill required, and they actually are historical objects, so I have no objection to their being called Individuals; but I do think they have ''essences'', or, rather, typical developmental systems and responses to typical environments; to preclude confusion, let us call these developmental types.
There is a recondite argument in metaphysics as to whether individuals in the metaphysical sense can have an essence-some say not, others say they can. I would not rehearse it here, as it is of interest only to a certain kind of philosopher. However, there's a much older sense, Aristotle's, that I think works well for individuals. Aristotle did not have a technical term for essence, especially not for natural objects, but instead he used the phrase ''the-what-itis-to-be''. 11 We can usefully ask what it is to be a member of a species. Generally, it is to share a genetic, developmental and ecological process. To be a member of Homo sapiens is to have some majority of typical properties: a certain number of chromosomes, genes, cell types, and ecological resources that reliably result, most of the time, in the morphology of the typical members of the species (Pigliucci 2003; Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006) . We can investigate this and list these properties (although we must be careful not to call the first genome, such as Craig Ventner's, the ''typical'' genome); this is a matter of empirical research. It is not a matter of definitions, it is a matter of finding out what the developmental types are by sampling populations and periods.
No philosopher of language who is inclined to the Millian kind of Kinds or to linguistic or logical essentialism is going to be happy with this, just as family resemblance predicates haven't been greatly liked by such philosophers in general (but see Gasking 1960 ), but it is a sense of the essence of species that is at once compatible with the biology, and consonant with the original history of the notion of essences. Species can be metaphysical Individuals, and yet have something mostly shared between its members, which can be granted the honorific of ''essence'', the what-it-is-to-be a member of that species, its developmental type.
Still, this does not solve the question of how we identify the Kind in the first place-we have to know there is a Kind before we start to investigate the essence of it in any sense. Consider a parallel case in physics: the periodic table of Mendele'ev (Hettema and Kuipers 1988; Scerri 2007) . By gathering together the observed properties of chemical elements, refined over time, a table was created without theory that was later explained by valency theory, and ultimately by quantum mechanics. There was an assumption that there were Kinds, but they were observed rather than defined. Taxa are phenomena that call for a theoretical explanation, rather than the units of some prior taxonomy or the variable of some prior theory. Again, this is not unlike Aristotle's own theory and practice (Charles 2002, p. 4) .
With respect to recent attempts to ''reintroduce'' essentialism into taxonomy, as opposed to functional biology, it appears to me that the objections against it that were raised in the 1960s and thereafter remain valid. No set of shared properties are common to every member of a taxon, nor to only members of that taxon, for all taxa; and in that respect the modern philosophical notion of essence (of Kripke 1980 , and I think Devitt's also) is biologically unnecessary. But a less malignant sense, in which all members of a taxon must share most of some set of ''essential'' properties to make them what-it-is-to-be members of that taxon, is perfectly coherent and biologically respectable, and it is that role that Aristotle actually seemed to think essences played, which I am calling developmental types. In my book I argue that Aristotle was not a taxonomic essentialist; he was, perhaps, a physiological essentialist and maybe that is the same thing, though I doubt it (see Charles 2002) . Nevertheless, he and everyone else assume that to be a member of some kind in biology, organisms must share the bulk of their properties by inheritance. This is the elaborated version of the tradition generative conception of species for the modern day, and it is either done in terms of genetic clustering (Cohan 2002; Mallet 1995; Rosselló-Mora and Amann 2001) , or of demographic and ecological interchangeability (Templeton 1989 (Templeton , 1998 or of genealogical coalescence (Baum 1998 (Baum , 2009 ).
12
Conclusions I consider, therefore, that essentialism is a straw-man target in biology, and that both taxonomic and developmental types are acceptable to use; indeed they are inevitable. Moreover, classification in biology is largely inductive, and not generated by theory, although there is no reason why a theory cannot suggest further ways to inductively classify. The requirement that classification be ''theory-free'' represents a now-defunct philosophy of science. It suffices that one does not use theory to support a classification that in turn is used to support the theory in a vicious circle.
Natural kinds that apply to biology (and the other historical sciences) are specified by types, not definitions or essential properties. The Millian notion of a Kind as a set of necessary and sufficient causal properties is something that fails abysmally in what Whewell called the palaetiological sciences, and which are now referred to as the ''special'' sciences. It works fine for the ''general'' sciences (again, the old genus-species distinction in play) where instances of a kind are the same everywhere, but in the special sciences, things are at best only approximately interchangeable and identical, and so the kinds are formed not by exact resemblance but by identity under every modification of form and function, as Owen defined homologies.
Furthermore, we must not think that biologists needed Darwin to see the world. Human beings are good or bad observers in direct proportion to the care and concern they take for their subjects. Where biological differences matter, as in herbal remedies, they identify species well without the need for science, but of course as the science becomes more elaborate and detailed in its findings, it refines likewise the folk taxonomies of ordinary culture (Atran 1990 (Atran , 1995 (Atran , 1998 (Atran , 1999 . Nor was Darwin irrelevant; his work changed the perspective from which we address taxonomy; it may even go so far as to undercut the ''intuitive'' ranks that Atran identifies in folk taxonomy (Godfrey-Smith 2009).
Therefore, it is OK to talk about essences, types (and typology!), and specific natures; so long as they aren't Mill's kinds of Kinds (unless they, in fact, are).
